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“How can perception be altered by language?” is the fundamental question 
of this article. Indeed, various studies have pointed out the influence of 
colour-related knowledge on object and colour perception, evoked by lingu-
istic stimuli. Here the relevance of the simulationist approach is assumed in 
order to explain this influence, where the understanding of colour-related 
words or sentences involves a process of colour simulation that is supported 
by a neuronal network partially similar to the network involved in colour 
perception. Consequently, colour-related knowledge and colour perception 
can interact through a process of pattern interference. In support of this idea, 
studies are discussed showing priming effects between colour simulation 
and colour perception, but two limitations are also raised. Firstly, these 
works all used between-category colour discrimination tasks that allow the 
intervention of lexical processes that can also explain priming. Secondly, 
these works control the congruency link between prime and target at the 
level of ‘colour category’, and no demonstration is made of an influence at 
the level of specific hues. Consequently, the simulationist view of 
language/perception interactions seems an interesting way to thinking but 
more experimens are needed in order to overcome some limitations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For many years, perception was considered to be a process extracting 
information from the environment (Pylyshyn 1981; Fodor 1983). In parallel to this 
classic cognitivist approach, many researchers have developed the idea that 
perception is a process of construction of information that can integrate various 
influences (e.g., Neisser 1967; Stein & Meredith 1995). Firstly, bottom-up signals 
that come from all senses, for example judgments about taste and smell can be 
altered by colour perception (Spence et al. 2010). Secondly, perception may be 
constrained by the carrying out of actions (Gibson 1979). Thirdly, emotion 
conjured up by a stimulus or by mood can disrupt or facilitate the perception of 
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emotional stimuli (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg 2009). Finally, a lot of studies have 
shown an influence of memory and knowledge on perception, mainly via 
language (e.g., label effect; see Pohl 2004 for a review).  
 The aim of this article is to suggest a possible explanation of language/ 
perception interaction based on simulationist approach of memory retrieval. We 
specifically focus our attention on the influence of colour-related words (e.g., 
banana, tomato) on colour perception because this case of language/perception 
interaction is strongly supported empirically. More specifically, we discuss two 
lines of research: (i) research on object recognition and (ii) on colour perception 
(section 2). In a third section, we present core ideas of sensorimotor models of 
memory including the simulationist conception of memory retrieval. Based on 
this approach, we develop the possibility that colour-related words can influence 
colour perception because each recruits common neuronal substrate. Indeed, in a 
sensorimotor model of memory colour simulation (i.e. a specific form of retrieval) 
would recruit sensory areas of the brain in order to represent sensory attributes 
of knowledge. In the fourth section, we discuss recent neuro-imaging evidences 
supporting this major assumption. However, based on these studies, we specified 
this basic idea. More precisely, we suggest that the neuronal substrate of colour 
simulation and colour perception would be best conceived as two partially 
overlapping neuronal networks that can interact only partially. This particular 
extension led us to expect two forms of priming: (i) from colour simulation to 
colour perception and (ii) from colour perception to colour simulation. In line 
with these predictions, we report a few studies demonstrating these possibilities 
(section 5). In a sixth section, we suggest that these studies have, at least, two 
limitations. We develop these limitations and try to propose possible experiments 
in order to overcome them in further research. Finally, in the last section (section 
7), we sum up the potential simulationist explanation of language/perception 
interactions and develop two empirical ideas in order to best support this 
approach. 
 
 
2. Influences of Colour Related Knowledge 
 
Researchers working on knowledge organization and memory have been 
interested in ‘sensori-knowledge’ that we define as the knowledge of objects that 
are strongly associated with specific sensory attributes, such as their shape, their 
colour, their location, their sound, their movement, and so on (e.g., Pulvermüller 
2003; Martin 2007; Barsalou 2008). In this flow of research, colour is a feature that 
has received much attention. This section develops studies suggesting the storage 
of colour in knowledge (section 2.1) and the influence of this knowledge (activat-
ed by processing linguistic stimuli) on perception (sections 2.2 and 2.3).  
 
2.1. Colour Associations: A Stored Information 
 
The memory of colour was first studied by pre-cognitivist researchers. For 
instance, Bruner & Postman (1949) studied colour associated with playing cards. 
Authors presented cards with congruent or incongruent colours: A red clover or 
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a black clover, a red heart or a black heart. The participant’s task was to judge the 
colour of the cards. Results indicated that in the incongruent condition, 
participants perceived a colour between red and black, suggesting an influence of 
the colour stored in memory (i.e. colour associated with the card) and thus the 
colour storage (see also Duncker 1939; Bruner & Postman 1949; Bruner et al. 1951; 
Harper 1953; Delk & Fillenbaum 1965). More recently, Reilhac & Jimenez (2006) 
brought to light the memory of colour by using black-and-white line drawings of 
objects strongly associated with yellow (e.g., banana) or green colours (e.g., 
artichoke). In this experiment, authors asked participants to categorize a drawing 
target presented subsequently to a drawing prime. Primes and targets either 
belonged to the same category or to a different one (i.e. animals or vegetables) 
and/or were of the same typical colour or of a different one (e.g., prime: Frog or 
lettuce, target: Crocodile). Only drawings with an important degree of colour 
agreement were used (estimated in a pilot study). Results showed priming when 
the drawings (i) belonged to the same category and (ii) more importantly when 
they were associated with the same typical colour. This last result suggests that 
colour association is stored in memory, more precisely in semantic memory. The 
study of Nijboer et al. (2007) focusing on scene recognition reinforces this conclu-
sion. Generally, the results in the recognition of visual scenes show a facilitation 
effect for the recognition of natural scenes (e.g., beach vs. town) when they are 
presented in their usual colours; thus suggesting the part played by colour in the 
recognition of visual scenes (Oliva & Schyns 2000). Nijboer et al. (2007) found that 
this facilitation effect is absent in a subject suffering from a developmental colour 
agnosia. According to Nijboer et al. (2007), this participant would have a specific 
impairment of colour association stored at a semantic level. Consequently, the fa-
cilitation observed in healthy participants’ results would be due to the retrieval of 
colour representations stored at a semantic level (absent in the agnosic patient). 
To resume, colour seems to be a sensory feature of particular concepts or 
knowledge (i.e. that represent objects strongly associated with a colour) that can 
be available and automatically activated when participants have access to these 
concepts. In the next two subsections we discuss experiments reporting influence 
of these concepts on perception and we will concentrate on experiments using 
linguistic stimuli.  
 
2.2. Influence on Perception of Coloured Objects 
 
In the field of the perception of objects, various studies have indirectly tested the 
possible influence of colour on perception. Indeed, there are two theories that 
oppose each other concerning the part played by colour in the recognition of 
objects. On the one hand, the ‘edge-based theory’ assumes that recognition is 
mainly or only based on the shape of the object (Biederman 1987), whereas on the 
other hand the ‘surface-plus-edge-based theory’ defends that colour is an 
important cue for the recognition of objects. To settle between these two theories, 
different studies have measured the time taken to recognize objects presented in 
colour in comparison with objects presented in their greyscale version (i.e. with-
out colour). The results obtained were recently synthesized by Bramão et al. 
(2011). Their review suggests that colour is an important cue only for the recogni-
The Influence of Language on Colour Perception 357 
tion of objects that are strongly associated with a particular colour (e.g., banana). 
These objects have been named ‘high diagnostic colour’ objects (i.e. HDC objects).  
 In one of their experiments, Tanaka & Presnell (1999, experiment 2) first 
presented two words each denoting an object, one appeared on the left-hand side 
of the screen and the other one on the right-hand side. In the second step, a 
drawing of an object was presented at the centre of the screen, in a coloured or 
greyscale version. Participants had to decide whether the object corresponded to 
the word presented earlier on the right or on the left-hand side (i.e. recognition 
task). Results showed that the decision time was faster when objects were HDC 
and appeared in colour compared with the conditions in which (i) the same 
objects were presented in greyscale and (ii) compared with the coloured or 
greyscale version of ‘low diagnostic colour’ objects (i.e. non HDC objects such as 
a chair). This result is important because it suggests that the recognition of objects 
involves information about colour and this supports the ‘surface-plus-edge-
based’ theory. This result is also important because it suggests that reading 
words denoting objects strongly associated with a colour facilitates perception of 
congruent coloured objects. 
 Therriault et al. (2009) extended this previous research. In their second 
experiment, they asked participants to read a word that represented either an 
HDC object (e.g., pumpkin) or a non-HDC object (e.g., chair, car). Then 
participants had to judge whether the subsequently presented drawing 
represented the same object or a different one (i.e. verification task). The latter 
drawing appeared in a congruent colour (e.g., an orange pumpkin), in an 
incongruent colour (e.g., a blue pumpkin), or in greyscale (i.e. control condition). 
Results demonstrated that response times in the congruent condition were faster 
than in the greyscale condition, and the latter were faster than in the incongruent 
condition. In others words, the activation of colour when participants read words 
can either facilitate or disrupt the recognition of objects. In a third experiment, 
Therriault et al. (2009) obtained similar results when attention wasn’t directly 
focused on colour.  
 In short, these various experiments and also others (see Bramão et al. 2011 
for a review) suggest that colours stored in memory can facilitate or disrupt per-
ception of objects presented in colour. Moreover, they demonstrate that this 
influence is produced by reading the linguistic stimuli that denotes colour-
related objects, suggesting an interaction between memory, language, and object 
perception. 
 
2.3. Influence on Colour Perception 
 
The retrieval of colour-related objects influences not only the perception of 
objects but also the perception of colours. For instance, Mitterer & de Ruiter 
(2008) conducted an experiment in which participants had to discriminate the 
colour of an object. Participants saw three black-and-white line drawings: A 
carrot (i.e. a prototypically orange object), a banana (i.e. prototypically yellow), 
and a sock (i.e. without a particular colour association). These specific drawings 
appeared in various hues from a ‘good orange’ to a ‘good yellow’. The results 
obtained with an ambiguous hue (i.e. between yellow and orange) were very 
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informative. When a banana drawing was in this ambiguous hue, it was more 
often seen yellow, whereas when the drawing represented a carrot, the ambigu-
ous hue was more often seen orange (compared with the sock condition). This 
result demonstrates convincingly that knowledge can influence colour per-
ception. 
 Olkkonen et al. (2008) reach the same conclusion with a very different 
method. In their experiments, participants were presented with two types of 
stimuli: (i) fruit and vegetables with a typical colour (e.g., lemon, cucumber) and 
(ii) disks (i.e. control condition). Participants had to adjust the colour of the 
objects in order to make them appear in grey. Participants had four keys allowing 
them to add a bit of blue, yellow, green or red. Results showed that for fruit and 
vegetables that posses a typical colour, participants added more of the colour 
opposed to the typical colour than in the control condition (to perceive in grey). 
In practical terms, when participants perceived a yellow banana and that they 
had to colour it in grey, they added more blue (i.e. the opposite colour to yellow 
in the colorimetric model used) in comparison to a yellow disk that they had to 
colour in grey (see also Hansen et al. 2006; Nijboer et al. 2011; Witze et al. 2011 for 
similar results).  
 Another work conducted by Naor-Raz et al. (2003) also shows an influence 
of colour knowledge on colour perception but by using linguistic stimuli. In their 
second experiment, Naor-Raz et al. (2003) used a Stroop-like procedure in which 
participants had to name the colour in which the words were printed. Words 
used represented objects strongly associated with a colour (e.g., banana) and 
could appear written in the congruent colour (e.g., banana written in yellow) or 
in an incongruent colour (e.g., banana written in purple). Results show that 
colour-naming times were faster for the incongruent conditions compared with 
the congruent ones. Despite a slowdown of response times opposed to previous 
data, these results also demonstrated the possibility that colour-related 
knowledge can influence colour perception (see also Klein 1964; Yee et al. 2012).  
 Consequently, studies presented here give evidence that retrieval of 
knowledge can influence colour perception and not only object perception. We 
report studies using pictures but also words that suggest, once again, that this 
influence may be mediated by reading linguistic stimuli (also Kubat et al. 2009). 
 The aim of this first section was to develop studies indicating an influence 
of colour-related knowledge on colour perception. To sum up, results reported 
here suggest that the retrieval of colour-related knowledge while words are 
processed can influence both recognition of coloured objects and perception of 
colours. More precisely, colour or colour association seems to be a component of 
some knowledge able to interact with the processing of perceived colour. This 
influence can be found when participants have to implicitly process colour such 
as for objects or scene recognition or explicitly when participants have to 
discriminate colour of target stimuli. Nevertheless, the underlying process that 
allows this interaction remains largely unexplored. One possible candidate lies in 
the retrieval process assumed by the sensorimotor models of memory. In the next 
section, we develop the core ideas of these models as well as the specific retrieval 
process that it assumes.  
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3. Simulationist Approach of Cognition and Memory 
 
Experiments presented above show an influence of colour-related knowledge 
elicited by language on perception (both object and colour perception); but why 
such an influence? Here, we will develop on the idea that a possible answer can 
be found in a recent approach of cognition that assumes both a distributed 
memory across the entire brain and a particular form of retrieval that can be 
called ‘simulation’. More precisely, it is possible to postulate that the interaction 
may be explained by the nature of the format in which colour knowledge is 
stored and retrieved from memory. In this section, we will first develop the cores 
ideas of the sensorimotor models of memory. Then, we explain the specificity of 
the simulation process by which knowledge is retrieved. Accordingly, we 
develop a simulationist explanation of memory/perception interaction based on 
the use of the same neuronal substrate.  
 
3.1. Sensorimotor Models of Memory 
 
The organization and format of knowledge that the sensorimotor models stand 
for is a key specificity of the models in comparison to other memory models 
developed until now. We will mainly develop on the originator model of Allport 
(1985); all the other sensorimotor models of memory are strongly similar to this 
one (e.g., Schacter et al. 1998; Martin & Chao 2001; Pulvermüller 2001; Barsalou et 
al. 2003; Versace et al. 2009). Allport (1985) explains that there are two ways of 
conceiving the implementation of knowledge (or concepts) in the brain. The first 
considers that knowledge corresponds to a precise physical unit (e.g., neuron or a 
group of neurons). Thus, a physical unit would be dedicated to the implemen-
tation of only one concept. The second considers that knowledge corresponds to 
a specific pattern of activity of a group of neurons. Thus, a same group of neu-
rons can support different concepts as long as different patterns of activity are 
involved (i.e. distributed knowledge). On the basis of the work of Hebb (1949), he 
explains that such patterns would form and reinforce themselves as long as co-
occurrent activations (pre- and post-synaptic) occur between neurons. More 
precisely, a neuronal pattern would constitute itself step by step via the alteration 
of synaptic weights (i.e. the correlation learning rule; Hebb 1949). This leads 
Allport to talk about ‘auto-associated patterns’ to support the idea that a pattern 
is a stable unit with specific properties. Nevertheless, until then Allport (1985) 
only details a model of knowledge already developed by the connectionists (e.g., 
Hinton 1981, Farah & McClelland 1991, McClelland & Rumelhart 1985). 
 Allport’s main contribution that will characterize the sensorimotor models 
of memory is the way he considers the implementation of knowledge at the level 
of the brain. According to him, the auto-associated patterns representing objects 
in memory would be composed of auto-associated sub-patterns distributed 
across all the sensory and motor domains. He takes for example a ‘telephone’ and 
explains that the pattern representing this object is distributed at a visual, tactile, 
auditory and motor level coded in the form of visual (e.g., format, size), tactile 
(e.g., texture), auditory (e.g., ringing) and motor (i.e. motor routine carried out 
with the object: to pick it up, to hold it, etc.) attributes. He also explains that the 
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attributes associated with the verbal interaction regarding the telephone, such as 
the phonological, spelling and written attributes of the referent word can be 
respectively stored at an auditory, visual and motor level. Thus, the encoding 
process is above all an associative process implying that the different sensory and 
motor attributes, supported by brain structures all across the brain, have to 
constitute themselves in a unit (i.e. binding). Moreover, Allport (1985) explains 
that the auto-associated sub-patterns can also be embedded in other patterns as 
long as they represent the objects sharing similar attributes. For example, the 
auto-associated sub-pattern of the ‘yellow’ attribute can be part of the pattern 
representing not only a ‘banana’ but also a ‘lemon’ or a ‘chick’, etc. In the wake of 
Allport (1985), different authors have added various ideas in order to precise this 
model. First, Pulvermüller (2003) adds the idea of functional units of the patterns. 
According to this author, the different areas composing the network would work 
as a unit. The functioning of this unit would depend on the integrity of each part 
of the unit. If one part of the cortex happens to be damaged, the networks based 
on this area would consequently be more a less affected. Secondly, Barsalou 
(2009) suggests that the neuronal patterns representing knowledge would not 
only be composed of sensory and motor attributes but also of emotional attri-
butes.  
 
3.2. Simulation Process of Retrieval 
 
Given the way with which knowledge is encoded and organized, the different 
sensorimotor models of memory agree on the nature of the retrieval process. 
These models assume that retrieval implies reactivation of neuronal networks 
representing knowledge, a process named ‘simulation’ (Barsalou 1999). 
Simulation has at least two main characteristics. Firstly, partial activation of a 
knowledge tends to reactivate all aspects of this knowledge, including all sensory 
attributes. This feature is due to the ‘process of pattern completion’ whereby an 
input that stimulated only a small number of neurons, composing a pattern, 
tends to reactivate the entire pattern. For instance, the reading of a word (e.g., 
banana) only involves the activation of the orthographic and phonological 
attributes of this knowledge. However, through the ‘pattern completion process’ 
all components of the network are rapidly active including the associated colour 
yellow (Pulvermüller 2003). This process occurs because every part of the pattern 
is strongly connected with each other through a Hebbian principle of reinforce-
ment (Hebb 1949). Barsalou et al. (2003) underlined the fact that a simulation is 
never complete and involves bias compared with the original sensory experience. 
Secondly, and more importantly, activation of various sensory attributes of 
knowledge seems to involve the use of common neuronal structures with on-line 
perception, more precisely structures involved in low-level perceptual pro-
cessing. This specificity is due to the fact that sensory attributes would be stored 
in areas of the brain also involved in perception. In the case of the word ‘banana’, 
the knowledge retrieved involves a specific network distributed in part on the 
neuronal substrate involved in colour perception. Accordingly, it is possible to 
assume that perception of colour and language can interact because language 
processing involves a simulation process in order to reactivate colour-related 
The Influence of Language on Colour Perception 361 
knowledge. The use of such a process involves the use of common neuronal 
structures or the sharing of the same processes or same resources by language 
processing and perception. In other words, the format in which colour infor-
mation is stored (connection between neurons of the visual area) and retrieved 
(by reactivation of the visual area) implies its automatic interaction with colour 
perception that uses the same visual areas.  
 To conclude, remember that the purpose of this section was to develop a 
process that would explain the influence of colour-related words on colour per-
ception. We suggest that one possible candidate is the specific retrieval process 
assumed in sensorimotor models of memory usually called ‘simulation’. Indeed, 
sensorimotor models of memory explain that memory would be a property of the 
entire brain including sensorimotor areas and retrieval of knowledge would 
occur via reactivation of neuronal patterns distributed over the brain. In the case 
of colour-related words, reading would involve activation of the entire patterns 
representing referents of words including in the visual area (specifically the 
colour perception area) supporting the colour attributes of knowledge. The 
recruitment of the same neuronal structures in order to simulate and perceive 
colour involves a meeting point for these two functions that can explain how 
colour-related knowledge can influence low-level colour perception. In the next 
section and in support of this simulationist explanation, we discuss studies 
showing the involvement of the same neuronal structures for colour simulation 
and colour perception (i.e. gyri lingual and fusiform). Moreover, based on these 
works we also specify more this possible explanation.  
 
 
4. Colour Perception and Colour Simulation: Similar Neuronal Patterns 
 
In this section, we will first review neuro-imaging studies having looked for the 
‘colour perception centre’ within the visual cortex. Then, we will review neuro-
imaging studies that have tried to point out the use of the same neuronal struc-
tures to retrieve colour-related knowledge. In a third sub-section, we discuss the 
implications of a neuropsychological dissociation in which participants have pre-
served mental colour imagery whereas colour perception is impaired (i.e. achro-
matopsia). We finally explain that colour perception and colour simulation seem 
to recruit partially overlapping neuronal networks. 
 
4.1. Cortical Structures Involved in Colour Perception 
 
Various experiments trying to situate the ‘cortical colour centre’ and conducted 
on healthy participants suggest different results. First, Zeki et al. (1991) situated 
this centre in the lingual gyrus in the occipital cortex. Its activation was found 
when participants passively viewed basic coloured stimuli (i.e. Mondrian). 
Authors have named this structure the hV4 area, human equivalent of the 
monkey V4 area (Zeki 1983a, 1983b, 1983c). Other studies have found a more 
extensive activation around the lingual gyrus when participants had to actively 
discriminate the colour of the stimuli, which suggests that there is a part played 
by the task applied to coloured stimuli (Corbetta et al. 1991; Guylás & Roland 
L. P. Heurley et al. 
 
362 
1994). In order to clarify the structures involved in colour perception taking into 
account the potential role of tasks, Beauchamp et al. (1999) carried out an 
experiment where they compared activations in function of the task. They 
adapted the Farnsworth-Munsell Test (Farnsworth 1957) usually used to detect 
achromats (i.e. people with a specific loss of colour vision). The procedure used 
involved perception of various hues of the same colour presented in a linear 
gradient from light hue to dark hue or presented in a disorderly manner. Two 
tasks were used: (i) A passive viewing condition of stimuli and (ii) an active 
condition where participants had to discriminate ordered stimuli and disorderly 
ones. When participants passively viewed coloured stimuli, results showed the 
same activation that Zeki et al. (1991) found and also an extended activation in 
the anterior portion of the fusiform gyrus. When participants carried out a 
judgment on the stimuli, three major results are founded. Firstly, ventro-occipito-
temporal activations both in lingual and fusiform gyri were observed as in the 
passive condition. Secondly, the activation of the fusiform gyrus is more 
important. Thirdly, they also observed distributed activations over the cortex, 
such as activations of V1 and V2 areas (i.e. within the visual cortex) and 
activations of the left frontal cortex, dorso-lateral part of the occipital cortex and 
superior parietal lobe in a majority of participants (see also Engel et al. 1997 for a 
similar result; see Gegenfurtner & Kiper 2003 for a review). 
 Based on these results, Beauchamp et al. (1999) explained that the carrying 
out of a task involving judgment about colour involves the activation of more 
colour selective regions compared with the passive condition. Consequently, they 
assumed a ‘decentralized view’ of colour perception in which there is no specific 
colour centre. The colour perception results from the activation of a complex 
distributed network across the cortex mainly concentrated around the lingual 
and fusiform gyri. Results of Corbetta et al. (1991) and Guylás et Roland (1994) 
that used a discrimination task as well as results of Zeki & Marini (1998) that 
used coloured photos of objects support this view. Indeed, Zeki & Marini (1998) 
made an experiment with complex colour pictures of objects and scenes rather 
than abstract coloured stimuli (i.e. Mondrian). In this experiment, results show 
that perception of these more complex stimuli also involves an activation of the 
lingual and fusiform gyri compared with the perception of the same objects in 
greyscale (see also Bramão et al. 2010 for similar results). Moreover, this ‘decen-
tralized view’ of colour perception is in accordance with results showing that a 
lesion of the V4 area in a monkey involves only a small disturbance of colour 
perception suggesting the implication of other structures (Gegenfurtner 2003). 
This view is also in accordance with complementary results showing the 
impairment of many areas in ‘cerebral achromates’, and not only of the fusiform 
and lingual gyri (Bouvier & Engel 2006). 
 In short, the ‘cortical colour centre’ should rather be seen as a distributed 
network, concentrated around the lingual and fusiform gyri, that can be differ-
entially activated according to the perceptual task and the coloured stimuli used.  
 
4.2. Cortical Structures Involved in Colour Simulation 
 
Various experiments have sought to bring to light that retrieving coloured-
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related knowledge or low-level colour perception call on to the same structures. 
The first experiments were conducted by Martin et al. (1995). They compared 
brain activations in two conditions; participants either had to name colour-
related objects represented by black-and-white line drawings (e.g., banana) or 
produce the colour associated with the objects (i.e. yellow). The underlying idea 
is that a production task would involve the retrieving of colour information while 
the naming task would not. Results showed an activation of the fusiform gyrus in 
the production task compared with the naming task. Moreover, they found the 
same results in a second experiment where drawings were replaced by words 
denoting the same objects. These results are congruent with neuro-imaging 
studies on colour perception that have showed the main role of the fusiform 
gyrus in colour perception (e.g., Beauchamp et al. 1999). Wiggs et al. (1999) 
carried out a similar experiment and obtained the same results. Moreover, they 
showed that the naming task also involved the activation of the fusiform gyrus 
compared with the control condition where participants viewed a visual noise. 
This last result suggests that simply naming an object strongly associated with a 
colour seems to involve the colour perception network. In another study, Chao & 
Martin (1999) directly compared, for the same participants, activations when (i) 
they perceived abstract coloured stimuli (i.e. Mondrian), (ii) named black-and-
white line drawings, and (iii) produced the associated colour. Results showed 
that perception and production did not activate the same neuronal structure, but 
very close structures 2 centimetres (cm) away from one another. Based on this 
result, Chao & Martin (1999) concluded that perception of colour and retrieval of 
coloured-related knowledge do not require the same neuronal structure. 
Nevertheless, Martin (2009) explains that they failed to find the use of exactly the 
same neuronal structure in this previous study, simply because they used a 
passive perception task: a passive-viewing Mondrian task which activated only 
the lingual gyrus (Zeki et al. 1991). It is possible that by using more complex 
stimuli or a more active-viewing condition (Beauchamp et al. 1999), perception 
would be more complex and an activation of the fusiform gyrus would be found 
in both tasks. Simmons et al. (2007) directly tested this hypothesis. In their 
experiment, authors compared, for the same participants, activations that 
occurred when they (i) carried out the same ‘colour-perception-task’ used by 
Beauchamp et al. (1999) and (ii) carried out a retrieval task where participants had 
to judge the veracity of sentences involving a concept and a colour (e.g., a banana 
is yellow?). The results showed an activation of a common neuronal substrate in 
the two tasks: The left fusiform gyrus. Moreover, activations that occurred in the 
retrieval task were consistent with activations found in previous studies (Chao & 
Martin 1999; Martin et al. 1995; Wiggs et al. 1999). This study shows that the 
retrieval of colour-related knowledge involves the recruitment of the same 
neuronal structures that are used to perceive colour and more precisely involved 
in low-level colour perception (i.e. that does not involve object identification or 
object recognition). Nevertheless, these structures only overlap when the task 
and the stimuli are relatively complex.  
 Moreover, consistent with the second experiment of Martin et al. (1995), the 
work of Simmons et al. (2007) suggests an activation of the fusiform gyrus when 
participants process linguistic inputs (i.e. short sentences, see also Goldberg et al. 
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2006 for a similar procedure and results). This idea of an activation of the fusi-
form gyrus when participants read colour-related words is also reinforced by 
studies conducted by Kellenbach et al. (2001) and Oliver & Thompson-Schill 
(2003). In their experiments, authors used the same procedure: They asked 
participants to judge if a word was associated or not with a colour (e.g., banana 
vs. snow). Black, white, and grey hues were defined as non-colours. Results 
showed an activation of part of the fusiform gyrus close to the active part found 
in the previous studies (≈1cm). 
 Recently two other studies extended these results. Firstly, Hsu et al. (2011) 
made an experiment in order to understand why the lingual gyrus activated in 
colour perception is not found to be activated in retrieval of colour-related 
knowledge. In order to best understand this absence of activation, Hsu et al. 
(2011) manipulated two variables : (i) level of detail of the colour simulation and 
(ii) the cognitive style of participants. In their experiment, participants had to 
carry out a judgment on luminance in the same way as in the work of Simmons et 
al. (2007) and also carry out a conceptual task involving colour simulation. More 
precisely, participants first saw two words representing two colour-related 
objects. Then, a third word would appear on the screen and participants had to 
select which of the two words represented the object associated with the closest 
colour. In one bloc, the three words belonged to the same colour category and 
similarities occurred at a specific hue level (e.g., ‘SCHOOL BUS’ compared with 
‘BUTTER’ and ‘EGG YOLK’). Whereas in another bloc, the three words belonged 
to different colour categories (e.g., ‘BEETLE’ compared with ‘PAPRIKA’ or 
‘BANANA’). The first bloc involved a colour simulation level deeper than the 
second bloc. Moreover, participants were divided in two groups based on their 
score to the VVQ (i.e. Verbal and Visual Questionnary; Kirby et al. 1988). In one 
group, participants had a visual cognitive style whereas in the other, participants 
had a verbal cognitive style. Results show an activation of the left lingual and 
fusiform gyri during the conceptual task. The activation of the fusiform gyrus is 
more important when the level of simulation is deeper and the activation of the 
lingual gyrus is more important for participants with a visual cognitive style. 
Moreover, Hsu et al. (2011) observed an overlap of structures activated in the 
colour perception task and in the conceptual task both at the level of the lingual 
and fusiform gyri. 
 In other recent work, Hsu et al. (2012) extended their previous results. In 
this experiment, Hsu et al. (2012) compared the activation found when partici-
pants have to compare colours associated with two words. In one condition, 
words denote colour objects with the same or a different colour (e.g., ‘BANANA’ 
vs. ‘BUTTER’). In a second condition, words denote achromatic objects identical 
or different on the level of grey (e.g., ‘SNOW’ vs. ‘COAL’). The goal is to compare 
the activation of the cortex in the ‘conceptual colour condition’ with the ‘concep-
tual achromatic condition’ in order to know which cortex areas are specifically 
activated when a ‘chromatic condition’ is compared with an ‘achromatic con-
dition’. Indeed, comparing a ‘chromatic condition’ with an ‘achromatic condition’ 
is the usual way to determine which cortex areas are specifically activated in 
colour perception (i.e. chromaticity effect; e.g., Beauchamp et al. 1999; Chao & 
Martin 1999; Simmons et al. 2007). In previous experiments, activation in the 
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conceptual task is obtained by comparing retrieval of colour-related knowledge 
with retrieval of non colour-related knowledge, like action concepts (e.g., Sim-
mons et al. 2007) and not ‘achromatic conditions’. The major result is the overlap 
of colour perception and colour simulation at the lingual gyrus level. 
 In short, all these studies converge on the evidence that retrieval of colour-
related knowledge, through the processing of linguistic stimuli, involves the 
activation of the same neuronal structures: the lingual and fusiform gyri also 
used when participants perceive colours or coloured objects (Zeki & Marini 1998, 
Beauchamp et al. 1999). Nevertheless, the implication of the same neuronal struc-
tures seems to depend on many variables such as the type of stimuli, cognitive 
style, type of conditions compared in order to define the neuronal structures 
activated. Moreover, it is important to note that colour conceptual tasks, as used 
in previous presented experiments, leave the possibility that participants used 
mental imagery of colour in order to complete the tasks. For instance, the 
conceptual task used by Hsu et al. (2012) is also used by researchers wanting to 
measure mental imagery of colour (e.g., De Vreese 1991; Bartolomeo et al. 1997; 
van Zandvoort et al. 2007). Consequently, it seems a risk to extend this similarity 
in brain structures to all tasks involving an access to colour-related knowledge, 
especially given the current state of knowledge on the question.  
 
4.3. Achromatopsia with Preserved Colour Mental Imagery? 
 
If the same structures are used to perceive and retrieve colour, it would not be 
possible to find people with impairment in colour perception (i.e. achromatopsia) 
and a preserved ability to retrieve colour (e.g., colour mental imagery). However, 
Shuren et al. (1996) and Bartolomeo et al. (1997) report two cases of patients who 
were impaired on tasks involving colour perception: the Ischihara test (Ishihara 
1974) and the Farnsworth-Munsell test (Farnsworth 1957). However, these pa-
tients accurately carried out tasks involving the imagination of colours: naming 
the colour of objects from memory, mentally comparing hues (De Vreese 1991), 
and giving the most objects as possible associated with a given colour. This disso-
ciation is an issue. Nevertheless, as Simmons et al. (2007) explain, the neuropsy-
chological evidence of the dissociation between the access to colour-related 
knowledge and the perception of colour does not necessarily imply that these 
two abilities are completely independent from one another. It is possible that the 
perception of colour and the access to the knowledge related to colour involve 
brain structures only partly identical. 
 
4.4. Overlap of Neural Networks 
 
Studies on colour perception suggest that a neuronal substrate must be conceived 
as a neuronal network distributed across the brain (i.e. ‘decentralized view’; cf. 
Bouvier & Engel 1997; Beauchamp et al. 1999). More precisely, this network 
seems to be mainly concentrated around the lingual and fusiform gyri, but its 
distribution is relative to various factors, such as a perceptual task and the type of 
stimuli perceived (Zeki & Marini 1998; Beauchamp et al. 1999; Bramão et al. 2010). 
On the other hand, studies focusing on the neuronal bases of the retrieval of 
L. P. Heurley et al. 
 
366 
colour-related knowledge, in other words ‘colour simulation’, point out the 
involvement of the same neuronal structures. Nevertheless, it is also possible to 
assume a ‘decentralized view’ in this case. Indeed, colour simulation seems to be 
supported by a distributed neuronal network also concentrated around the 
lingual and fusiform gyri ( Martin et al. 1995; Chao & Martin 1999; Wiggs et al. 
1999; Kellenbach et al. 2001; Oliver & Thompson-Schill 2003; Goldberg et al. 2006; 
Simmons et al. 2007; Hsu et al. 2011, 2012), but the distribution of the network 
changes depending on various factors such as a conceptual task, the type of 
stimuli, the type of cognitive style, etc. Moreover, results agree with the possibi-
lity that these two networks partially overlap each other at the level of the lingual 
and fusiform gyri because these structures are active in conceptual and percep-
tual tasks. This overlap also depends on the combination of various factors affect-
ing independently colour perception and colour simulation (i.e. type of coloured 
stimuli, type of perceptual and conceptual task, etc.). Note that this distributed 
approach is more consistent with studies demonstrating a dissociation between 
central colour blindness (i.e. achromatopsia) and colour imagery ( Shuren et al. 
1996; Bartolomeo et al. 1997). Indeed, this dissociation implies that it seems exag-
gerated to consider the perception and simulation of colour as fully supported by 
well-defined structures, such as the lingual and fusiform gyri, which once 
damaged must affect both functions simultaneously. In contrast, a design in 
terms of overlap of distributed networks allows the possibility of relatively inde-
pendent processing. 
 Consequently, this conception helps explain the influence of colour simu-
lation on colour perception through a process of ‘neuronal pattern interference’. 
Indeed, colour simulation can affect colour perception because colour simulation 
recruits a neuronal network similar, in particular points, to the network used 
when colours are perceived. The idea of pattern interference can already be 
found in the work of Masson (1995) who tries to explain the semantic priming 
from a connectionist point of view. The idea of Masson (1995) is that we observe 
semantic priming because the neuronal pattern involved in the representation of 
the prime can be, at least, partially similar to the neuronal pattern representing 
the target. Accordingly, priming emerges from the pre-activation of parts of the 
neuronal network representing the target that are common with the neuronal 
network representing the prime. The same idea can be assumed for the case of 
the influence of colour simulation on colour perception. Indeed, colour simu-
lation induces a pre-activation of certain parts of the neuronal network (i.e. 
lingual and fusiform gyri) that will be re-used for perception. 
 In others words, retrieval of colour-related knowledge involves the acti-
vation of parts of a neuronal network also involved in low-level colour per-
ception. More importantly, this approach of interference between retrieval of 
colour-related knowledge and colour perception allows specific predictions 
about this interaction. Firstly, it is possible to expect a form of priming of colour 
perception whereas the prime involves only colour simulation. Indeed, until now 
all the works that show an influence of knowledge on colour perception use 
procedures in which stimuli simultaneously involve access to knowledge and 
perception of colour (e.g., coloured drawings and coloured words). These two 
activities are not separated in time. But the idea that this interference arises from 
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the overlap of network parts also predicts the possibility of interference even 
when the simulation is not performed at the same time as perception. 
Consequently, colour simulation can affect colour perception in a priming pro-
cedure. Moreover, the direction of influence is not restricted, and colour per-
ception could also influence colour simulation. In the next section, we report 
experiments that support the possibility to observe an influence even when simu-
lation and perception of colour are supported by temporally separate stimuli (i.e. 
a form of perceptual priming). Moreover, we also report evidence showing re-
versed priming because the direction of the influence is not restricted. 
 
 
5. Bidirectional Priming between Colour Simulation and Colour Perception  
 
The simulationist view of cognition emphasizes that colour-related knowledge 
can influence colour perception because the retrieval of this type of knowledge 
involves a simulation process using a neuronal network partially similar to the 
network involved in colour perception. This conception leads to the idea that 
colour simulation can affect colour perception even if these two processes are 
temporally separated. In this fifth section we will subsequently report two lines 
of evidence supporting this possibility. Firstly, we discuss results showing the 
possibility to prime colour perception via colour simulation and in a second sub-
section we discuss works showing the possibility to prime colour simulation via 
colour perception.  
 
5.1. Priming of Colour Perception by Colour Simulation 
 
The first interesting work showing a priming of colour perception via colour 
simulation is the work of Richter & Zwaan (2009). Authors conducted an experi-
ment where participants saw a coloured square, immediately followed by a word 
and followed itself by a second coloured square, in each trial. Participants had to 
perform two different tasks successively: They (i) had to carry out a lexical 
decision on the word and (ii) decide if the second square appeared in the same or 
in a different colour as the first one. In target trials, words were nouns that 
denoted a colour (e.g., yellow, blue) that corresponded or not to the colour of the 
last square. Results showed that response times were shorter when the colour of 
the word was congruent with the colour of the last square in comparison with the 
condition where the colours were different. This result suggests that colour 
perception involving low-level processes can be influenced by linguistic stimuli 
even when simulation is carried out just before colour perception. Nevertheless, 
this study has a limitation. Indeed, in order to compare the two coloured targets, 
participants have to store, in short-term memory, the colour of the first square in 
order to compare it with the second square. Consequently, the influence of words 
can be situated at a perceptual level (i.e. affects the perception of the second 
square) or at a memory level (i.e. affects the remembering of the first square). 
This second possibility is supported by various works showing an influence of 
colour-related knowledge on the remembering of colour (Duncker 1939; Loftus 
1977). 
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 In order to overcome this limitation, we have recently conducted 
experiments using a perceptual task that precludes the conservation of colour in 
memory. Moreover, we used words denoting objects associated with a colour 
and not directly a colour label in order to extend the results of Richter & Zwaan 
(2009). In the first experiment (Heurley et al. 2012), participants saw words 
presented very briefly and immediately followed by a green or yellow circle. 
Participants had to discriminate only the colour of the circle (i.e. chromatic 
discrimination task). Prime words denoted natural things strongly associated 
with a green or yellow colour (e.g., chick, artichoke). This strong association was 
controlled in a pilot study where participants had to give the first colour that 
came to mind when they read colour-related words. Only words with a colour 
consensus higher than 70% were used. Results showed facilitation when the 
colour elicited by the words matched the perceived colour compared with the 
condition where the colours were different. We replicated this facilitation in a 
second experiment where the participant’s task did not explicitly focus attention 
on colour or involve a colour label answer. Indeed, lexical priming of colour 
name could explain the facilitation effect in this experiment. In other words, 
perception of the word ‘banana’ elicits spontaneously the word ‘yellow’ 
facilitating the ‘yellow response’. In the second experiment (Heurley et al. in 
press), participants saw two circles in the target’s display. These two circles were 
presented in the same colour or in a different one. In the case where the circles 
appeared in the same colour, they could either appear in yellow or in green. 
Participants had to detect whether target circles were presented in the same 
colour or in different colours. When circles appeared in the same colour, results 
showed facilitation when the colour of the two circles was congruent with the 
colour elicited by the prime (e.g., two yellow circles preceded by the word 
‘BANANA’) compared with the condition in which the colour elicited by the 
prime was different (e.g., ‘ARTICHOKE’). In this last experiment, the effect 
observed can not be explained in terms of lexical priming because response labels 
were not colour labels. Moreover, the use of a mental imagery strategy, that 
could explain our results, seems precluded because words were only presented 
during 150 ms (with a 350 ms SOA) and participants only had to read the words 
as fast as possible. 
 Taken together, these studies support the possibility of obtaining per-
ceptual colour priming whereas priming occurs via colour simulation. In these 
experiments, primes involve a colour simulation activating a neuronal network 
composed of parts that are also used by the neuronal network used in order to 
perform the perceptual task on the target. Moreover, primes are always words 
(colour words or words denoting colour-related objects) showing that this effect 
can be mediated by language comprehension as is assumed by various resear-
chers (Pulvermüller 2001, 2003; Barsalou et al. 2003; Zwaan & Kaschak 2009). 
 
5.2. Priming of Colour Simulation by Colour Perception 
 
If language influences colour perception through the use of partial overlapping of 
close neuronal networks, it is also plausible to expect a reverse influence: of 
perception on language. Indeed, colour perception may pre-activate part of the 
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network that could be used to process linguistic stimuli. The first evidence of this 
opposite influence is found in a study by Richter & Zwaan (2009) already 
reported. In their study, participants first saw a coloured square followed by a 
word denoting the same or a different colour (or a non word), followed itself by a 
second coloured square (in the same colour as the first square or in a different 
one). Results showed that lexical decision times for words were influenced by the 
colour of the first square: response times were faster when the same colour was 
perceived and simulated compared with the condition where they were different. 
Thus, Richter & Zwaan (2009) showed an influence of colour perception on 
language processing. This result seems to suggest that language processing can 
be influenced by perception. However, in this work, words used denoted directly 
a colour, thus this can give place to another explanation in lexical terms. For 
instance, perception of a colour can automatically activate the associated word 
that facilitates subsequent language processing of a congruent word (i.e. colour 
labels). In consequence, the facilitation observed can be explained by lexical 
priming.  
 Nijboer et al. (2006) conducted an experiment where the same reverse 
influence was found. But in this experiment, authors used colour-related words 
(e.g., tomato) thus this prevents an explanation in terms of lexical priming. In this 
experiment, participants had to decide whether a target word was an existing 
word or a pseudo-word (i.e. lexical decision task). In each trial, participants saw a 
coloured prime followed by a target word or a pseudo-word. Fifty six colour-
related words were mixed with non-related colour words (i.e. 168) and pseudo-
words. Primes used could occur in seven prototypical colours (i.e. red, blue, 
green, yellow, pink, orange, and brown). In target trials, a colour-related word 
could be preceded by a congruent colour patch (e.g., red patch – TOMATO) or an 
incongruent colour patch (bleu patch – TOMATO). Results showed that lexical 
decision times for colour-related words were shorter in the congruent condition 
than in the incongruent condition. Moreover, Nijboer et al. (2006) added a control 
condition where the colour patch was multicoloured. Lexical decision times in 
this condition differed from the congruent condition but not from the 
incongruent condition. These results strongly support the possibility that 
language processing can be facilitated by an earlier low-level colour perception.  
 Recently, Gebuis et al. (2009) investigated bidirectional influence between 
perception and language in colour-grapheme synesthetes. In colour-grapheme 
synesthesia, letter or number leads to a vivid and robust experience of a colour. 
Accordingly, this effect is interesting for our purpose because this effect can be 
seen as a particular case of language/perception influence. Gebuis et al. (2009) 
explained that it is well established that in participants with colour-grapheme 
synesthesia, colour perception can be affected by the perception of numbers. For 
instance, naming the colour of the ink in which a number is written can be 
facilitated if the colour associated with the number in the memory of the 
synesthetes is congruent. However, if the colour associated with the number is 
different, a slowdown is observed: this is a type of Stroop effect. Accordingly, the 
access to colour information when numbers are processed seems to be strongly 
supported. The reverse access: the access to number information when colours 
are processed also seems possible. In their experiment, Gebuis et al. (2009) try to 
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demonstrate this bidirectional link between number and grapheme in 
synesthesia. Participants saw a number coloured in the colour associated with 
this number in their memory (congruent condition) or coloured in a different 
colour (incongruent condition). Then participants had to do two different tasks. 
In the first one, they had to name aloud the number in order to investigate the 
influence of colour on number processes. In the second task, they had to name 
aloud the colour of the ink in order to investigate the influence of number on 
colour processes. Gebuis et al. (2009) observed a priming effect in both tasks 
showing the bidirectional influence between number and colour in synesthetes. 
More precisely, perception of a number involved access to colour information 
(i.e. that can be named in the context of our article: colour simulation) that 
influenced colour perception, and perception of colour involved access to 
numerical information that influenced number processing. This last influence 
suggests that colour perception could automatically reactivate the link in 
memory between the colour and the number (as a particular colour/object 
association) influencing number processing. 
 To sum up, in this fifth section, we reported works suggesting the possible 
priming of colour simulation on colour perception as well as the reverse priming. 
These works support the idea that colour-related knowledge and colour 
perception interact in a bidirectional way via the reciprocal influence of 
underlying neuronal networks (i.e. pattern interference process). Indeed, as 
predicted by this approach it is possible to find an influence even when colour 
simulation and colour perception are performed separately in time. More 
precisely, it is possible to observe a form of colour priming when prime only 
involves a simulation of colour, not real perception and it is also possible to find 
semantic priming when prime involves real perception, not semantic processing. 
However, in the next section, we develop two limitations of these various studies 
that challenge the simulationist approach. 
 
 
6. Two Problems for the Simulationist Approach 
 
In the previous sections, we assumed the possibility that colour-related 
knowledge could influence colour perception through a colour simulation 
process. Studies supporting this hypothesis show an influence of colour-related 
knowledge on colour perception in a priming paradigm (Heurley et al. 2012, in 
press, Nijboer et al. 2006, Richter & Zwaan 2009). However, we suggest that these 
works have two limitations. First, recent studies suggest the possibility that 
specific colour perception tasks can not only involve perceptual processes but 
also lexical processes. Accordingly, it is possible that the influence of colour-
related knowledge on colour perception occurs at a lexical level and not at a 
perceptual level in previously reported experiments. Secondly, various 
experiments, discussed in the previous sections, manipulate the congruence link 
between knowledge and coloured target at a ‘colour category’ level and not at the 
level of specific hues. However, it is possible that colour simulation involves 
simulation of specific hues (e.g., dark green, light green) rather than the general 
‘colour category’ (e.g., green). We develop these two problems in the two 
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following sub-sections and based on the literature, we try to put forward ideas in 
order to overcome these limitations.  
 
6.1. Lexical Influence? 
 
Studies on categorical perception of colour have shown that response times to 
discriminate two hues belonging to two different colour categories (e.g., green 
hue vs. yellow hue) are shorter than response times to discriminate two hues 
belonging to the same colour category (e.g., dark green vs. light green; see 
Goldstone & Hendrickson 2009 for a review). Bornstein & Korda (1984) have 
developed the idea that this difference could be due to the intervention of two 
cues in order to discriminate two hues from two different categories (i.e. 
between-category discrimination): a perceptive cue and a lexical cue. However, 
only the perceptive cue would be used to discriminate two hues from the same 
category (i.e. within-category discrimination). This idea is similar to the ‘Whorf 
hypothesis’ according to which colour perception could be influenced by lang-
uage (i.e. colour labels; see Kay & Kempton 1984). 
 Recently, a number of works have confirmed this hypothesis. For example, 
Roberson and Davidoff (2000) carried out an experiment where every trial started 
with the brief appearance of a coloured target on the screen. This was followed 
by a 5 second delay. Then two colours appeared. Participants had to choose 
which of the two colours corresponded to the first coloured target (i.e. ‘two 
Alternative-Forced Choice’ task). The two coloured choices either belonged to the 
same category (i.e. within-category discrimination) or to two different categories 
(i.e. between-category discrimination). During the five second delay, participants 
either (i) faced a white screen (i.e. control condition), either (ii) had to follow a 
curbed line with the eyes (i.e. visual interference), either (iii) read a list of words 
(i.e. verbal interference). Results show a classic effect in the control condition: 
participants are faster to discriminate the target colour when the two colours 
belong to two different categories. This effect persists even with a visual 
interference. However, the effect disappears when the interference is of a verbal 
nature. Roberson & Davidoff (2000) explain that the verbal task disrupts the 
retention of the label of the colour of the target. This disruption cancels the lexical 
cue supposed to create an advantage in the between-category discrimination 
task, which induces a disappearance effect. This result thus confirms the 
involvement of a lexical cue in a between-category discrimination task (see 
Pilling et al. 2003 for identical results). 
 Gilbert et al. (2006) carried out another experiment confirming this 
conclusion. Participants had to discriminate two targets which appeared 
simultaneously on the screen. At each trial, twelve coloured squares were 
presented in a circle. One square among the twelve was presented in a different 
hue. The participants’ task was to detect as fast as possible if this different square 
had appeared on the left or right side of the circle. The hue of the target square 
could either belong to the same category as the other squares or to a different 
category. Gilbert et al. (2006) observe a ‘categorical perception effect’ only when 
the targets were presented on the right side of the circle. Authors explain these 
results by the fact that the right part of the circle is situated in the right visual 
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field which is linked to the left hemisphere dedicated to language processing. 
Consequently, this result would confirm the involvement of linguistic processing 
during colour perception, at least during a between category discrimination task 
(see also Drivonikou et al. 2007).  
 Recently, Siok et al. (2009) carried out an experiment in which they directly 
focused on the cortical structures activated during a between- and a within-
category discrimination task. For this, Siok et al. (2009) used the same procedure 
as Gilbert et al. (2006); however, this time participants’ cortical activity was 
recorded by fMRI. The results highlight an activation of the areas involved in the 
processing of language when participants have to discriminate a square target 
coloured in a hue belonging to a category different to the other squares (i.e. 
between-category discrimination task). This last study reinforces, in the same 
way as the two previous ones, Bornstein & Korda (1984)’s hypothesis according 
to which between-category discrimination involves two cues: a perceptive and a 
lexical cue.  
 Taken together, these results confirm the possibility that colour perception 
involves lexical processes, at least in a between-category discrimination task. 
Previous results demonstrating that colour-related knowledge influences colour 
perception all used between-category discrimination tasks. For instance, in one of 
our experiments (Heurley et al. 2012), the perceptual targets were composed of 
two coloured circles that appeared in the same colour (i.e. they belonged to the 
same colour category) or in a different colour (i.e. they belonged to two different 
colour categories). In the work of Nijboer et al. (2006), various primes were used 
that belonged to different categories, the authors never used different hues of a 
same colour category. Richter & Zwaan (2008) tried to control the link between 
the two different colour targets that participants had to compare in order to 
obtain colours that belonged to the same lexical category. They did a pre-test 
where participants had to name the colour of various targets used. It seems that, 
at least for various couples of colours used, a colour would imply different colour 
labels. Accordingly, it is possible that in these various experiments, the colour 
perception task used implied lexical processes. This is an issue because lexical 
cues used in order to perceive colour could be influenced by colour labels 
associated with colour-related knowledge. Consequently, the influence observed 
could be the result of a form of lexical priming of the label rather than perceptual 
priming. In order to ensure this possibility, further experiments would need to be 
developed in which participants would have to carry out a within-category 
discrimination task on coloured targets primed by congruent or incongruent 
colour-related words. Indeed, this type of task only seems recruit low-level 
perceptual processes. Accordingly, if retrieval of colour-related knowledge 
involves a colour simulation process that influences colour perception via 
neuronal pattern interference, we would always observe perceptual priming. 
 
6.2. Simulation of Hues?  
 
The second problem concerns what is simulating in colour simulation? All the 
experiments reported here agree, implicitly, on the idea that colour simulation is 
the simulation of ‘colour categories’ and not specific hues. Indeed, all studies 
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control the link of congruence between prime and target at a level of colour 
category. For instance, Richter & Zwaan (2009) used names of colour categories 
(e.g., BLUE, YELLOW, GREEN) that matched or mismatched with coloured 
targets at a level of colour categories (e.g., blue, yellow, or green patches). In 
Heurley et al. (in press) or in Nijboer et al. (2006), words used represented objects 
associated with a colour (e.g., BANANA, TOMATO, ARTICHOKE), that matched 
or mismatched with coloured patches also at a level of colour categories (e.g., 
yellow, red or green patches). More precisely, in Heurley et al. (2012, in press), we 
used for instance the word ‘LETTUCE’ and the word ‘ARTICHOKE’ presented 
just before two simultaneous green patches in each trials (i.e. congruent trials) or 
two simultaneous yellow patches (i.e. incongruent trials). In the congruent trials, 
there was congruence because the labels of the colour associated with the words 
and with the patches were similar (i.e. label ‘green’). Indeed, the difference of 
hues associated with the object was not taken into account. For instance, the fact 
that the hue of green associated with the word ‘LETTUCE’ is lighter than the hue 
of green associated with ‘ARTICHOKE’ was not taken into account because the 
same green colour was used as target each time. Consequently, the link of 
congruence between words and patches was controlled at the level of colour 
category and not at a level of specific hue. 
 At the perceptual level, discrimination of specific hues of a ‘colour 
category’ seems natural. For instance, in Beauchamp et al. (1999), participants 
were able to discriminate various hues of a same colour category in order to 
discriminate if the various patches were arranged from a dark hue to a light hue 
or were arranged in a disorderly manner (see also Simmons et al. 2007; Hsu et al. 
2011, 2012). Results of studies on categorical perception of colour also support 
this capacity. Indeed, participants are able to discriminate various hues of a same 
colour category in within-category discrimination tasks (Roberson & Davidoff 
2000; Pilling et al. 2003; Gilbert et al. 2006; Drivonikou et al. 2007; Siok et al. 2009). 
Finally, a recent study on colour memory also reinforces this possibility. In the 
experiment of Allen et al. (2011) participants had to adjust a test patch in order to 
look like the patch seen just before. Each trial was divided in three phases. In the 
‘learning phase’, participants saw a coloured circle during 60s and were instruct-
ed to memorize the colour. Then in a retention phase, participants had to count 
during 120s. More precisely, beeps indicated to participants to say out loud a 
number from 0 to 9 in a random order. The goal of this task was to prevent verbal 
rehearsal of the colour test. In a test phase, participants had to set the new central 
patch to look like the test colour they remembered seeing previously. Moreover 
in order to test the role of working memory, participants were divided in two 
groups: one group with high working memory capacity and the other with low 
capacity, tested via the ‘Reading Span’ and the ‘Operation Span’ tests (Daneman 
& Carpenter 1980; Unsworth et al. 2005). Results showed that the differences 
between coordinates of the selected colour and colour learning, in the specific 
colourimetric model used, were relatively low suggesting that participants had a 
good capacity to remember specific hues of learning colour (see also Olkkonen et 
al. 2008; Witze et al. 2012). Let us note that this result was found for the two 
groups of participants showing the independence of working memory capacity. 
Taken together, these results support the idea that participants are able to 
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discriminate different hues. Consequently, if colour simulation is really a neuron-
al simulation of colour perception, colour simulation can involve simulation of 
hues, not just ‘colour categories’.  
 One result of Hsu et al. (2011), already presented, partially supports the 
possibility to simulate specific hues in word reading. Indeed, in their 
experiments, participants first saw two words on the screen representing two 
colour-related objects. Then, a third word would appear on the screen and 
participants had to choose the object that was associated with the most similar 
colour. In one of the two blocs, the three words belonged to the same colour 
category and similarity occurred at a level of specific hue. For instance, 
participants had to compare the target word ‘SCHOOL BUS’ with two words also 
associated with the colour yellow: ‘BUTTER’ and ‘EGG YOLK’. In this case, the 
answer was ‘EGG YOLK’ because its yellow hue is closest to the yellow hue of a 
school bus than to the yellow hue of butter. In this condition, Hsu et al. (2011) 
observed an activation of the fusiform and lingual gyri that are also involved in 
colour perception. Accordingly, this result seems to suggest the possibility to 
simulate specific hues in word reading. Nevertheless, a major question remains 
open: can hue simulation influence hue perception? Indeed, no work seems 
designed to test this hypothesis whereas it is a possible prediction of the simu-
lationist approach of knowledge/perception interaction. In order to test this new 
prediction, further experiments would need to control the link of congruence bet-
ween colour-related knowledge and coloured targets at the level of specific hues.  
 In this section, we developed two limits of current works supporting the 
simulationist approach of knowledge/perception interaction in colour percepti-
on. Firstly, we developed the idea that perceptual tasks generally used could 
involve lexical processes that could explain the observed priming without the use 
of a simulation process. To overcome this possibility, we propose to use within-
category colour discrimination tasks in order to ensure the recruitment of lexical 
processes. Secondly, we developed the possibility that colour simulation could 
involve simulation of specific hues. Indeed, up to now, experiments have only 
controlled the congruency link at the level of colour category and absolutely not 
at the level of specific hues. Consequently, it is not possible to know if colour 
simulation can influence perception at a hue level. To overcome this limitation, 
new experiments must be carried out controlling the link of congruency at the 
level of specific hues. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
“How can perception be altered by language?” was the fundamental question of 
this article. Indeed, various studies have pointed out the influence of colour-
related knowledge on object and colour perception (Tanaka & Presnell 1999; 
Naor-Raz et al. 2006; Mitterer et De Ruiter 2008; Theurriault et al. 2009). Thus, the 
article does not focus directly on the language function but more precisely on 
how language can interact with perception, specifically with colour perception. 
We assumed the relevance of the simulationist approach which defends a specific 
form of retrieval using the same neuronal substrate than low-level perception. 
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We developed the hypothesis that the use of a common structure creates a 
meeting point for language and perception by coordinating the two through the 
neural bases of a distributed memory. Results from neuroimaging studies 
studying neuronal bases of colour perception and colour simulation allow us to 
conclude that these two functions are supported by two distributed neuronal 
networks (Shuren et al. 1997; Bartolomeo et al. 1998; Simmons et al. 2007; Hsu et al. 
2011, 2012). These two networks can interact at particular point and also seem 
independent. Consequently, we develop the idea that colour-related knowledge 
and colour perception can interact through a process of pattern interference 
(Masson 1995). Based on this idea, we suggest the possibility that colour 
simulation and colour perception can interact in a bi-directional way even when 
colour simulation and colour perception are slightly separated in time. In other 
words, we expected the possibility to obtain a priming effect between colour 
simulation and colour perception. In support of this hypothesis, we discussed 
results showing (i) an influence of words denoting colour or colour-related 
objects on a subsequent low-level colour processing (Heurley et al. 2012, in press, 
Richter & Zwaan 2009), and (ii) results that suggest a reverse influence, from 
perception to language processing (Nijboer et al. 2006; Gebuis et al. 2009; Richter 
& Zwaan 2009). These various works are in accordance with the simulationist 
view; nevertheless we also develop two limitations of these studies. Indeed, these 
works all used between-category colour discrimination tasks that allow the inter-
vention of lexical processes in colour perception, not only perceptual processes 
(Bornstein & Korda 1984; Pilling et al. 2003; Roberson & Davidoff 2003; Gilbert et 
al. 2006; Drivonikou et al. 2007). This limitation is important because the priming 
effect observed can be potentially explained in terms of lexical priming rather 
than perceptual priming. The second limitation is that these works control the 
congruency link between prime and target at the level of ‘colour category’ rather 
than at a level of specific hue. But, if colour simulation is a neuronal simulation of 
colour perception, hue simulation can be expected because hue perception is 
possible (e.g., Beauchamp et al. 1999; Simmons et al. 2007; Allen et al. 2011; Hsu et 
al. 2011, 2012). In order to overcome these two limitations and to support and 
extend the simulationist explanation, we propose new experimental controls. 
 To conclude, we would like develop two other untested predictions of the 
simulationist view. First, it is possible to expect an effect of delay that separates 
colour simulation and colour perception. Indeed, activation of a neuronal pattern 
can imply a refractory period of their constitutive neurons that preclude their 
immediate re-use. Consequently, it is possible that with a short SOA, the 
influence would not be obtained or a slowdown could appear. A slowdown of 
response times when the previous simulation is congruent with the actual 
perception has been obtained in two studies. For instance, in the experiment of 
Estes et al. (2008), a slowdown of response times was observed when prime 
words were associated with a spatial location identical to the location where 
subsequent perceptual targets appeared (e.g., the word ATTIC followed by a 
perceptual target on the top of the screen). Meteyard et al. (2007) studied the 
impact sentence implying a lateral movement towards the right or the left-hand 
side on the perception of a moving stimulus. Once again, when the simulated 
and perceived movements were identical, response times were longer. These 
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works allow the possibility to observe the same slowdown for a particular SOA 
in the case of colour perception. 
 A second possible prediction concerns the neuronal process 
underlying the influence of colour simulation on colour perception. 
Possible insight comes from the work of Kristjánsson et al. (2007) who focused on 
the neuronal correlates of the perceptual priming of colour. Kristjánsson et al. 
(2007) replicated the experiment of Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) while cortical 
activity was recorded by fMRI. Three coloured diamond shapes placed as a 
triangle were presented to the participants. The right or left diamond shape 
placed at the base of the triangle was presented in a different colour. Participants 
simply had to say in what form appeared the target coloured differently from the 
others. Kristjánsson et al. (2007), in the same way as Maljkovic & Nakayama 
(1994), observed a priming effect when the colour of the target was the same 
during two consecutive trials in comparison to when the colour of the target 
changed from one trial to another. Moreover, Kristjánsson et al. (2007) observed a 
decrease of the BOLD signal (Blood Oxygen Level Dependent) in the visual areas 
involved in the perception of colour. This ‘suppression effect’ is often observed in 
perceptual priming tasks and is seen to be the neuronal correlate to perceptual 
priming (for a review see Wiggs & Martin 1998). In the case where the priming 
effect observed when colour simulation precedes colour perception results from 
perceptual priming, it is possible to expect the same decrease of the BOLD signal 
in the visual areas involved in the perception of colour. Such a result could bring 
to light the fact that colour simulation and colour perception recruit the same 
neuronal substrate as well as the fact that the influence of colour simulation on 
colour perception is supported by the same neuronal process as colour priming.  
 Finally, in this article, we developed a functional consequence of grounded 
and embodied language on the sensorimotor areas of the brain: the possibility 
that language can influence perception through a simulation process (and also 
the reverse influence). Not only did we focus our attention on how cognition and 
language are embodied or grounded but we also focused our attention on the 
functional consequence of embodying cognition for the cognitive system. In line 
with recent work of the embodied and grounded approach (Wu & Barsalou 2009; 
Barsalou 2003; Pulvermüller 2010), we tried to build explanations for cognitive 
functioning without a symbolic and amodal architecture. According to this 
approach, memory, knowledge, language and perception function in a 
coordinated way which can either alter or facilitate perception. We agree that this 
view needs more work in order to overcome various limitations and to test other 
possible predictions. However, it seems an interesting way to conceive the 
language/perception interaction while including the constraints of the neuronal 
substrate underlying cognitive functioning. 
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